From Shelf to Practice: Making the NIST AI Risk Framework Work for Your Business

Cover graphic for From Shelf to Practice: Making the NIST AI Risk Framework Work for Your Business
Fig. 1. NIST AI RMF Article Infographic, Jeremy Swenson, 11/14/2026.

AI GOVERNANCE · RISK MANAGEMENT

A leader’s playbook for turning voluntary AI guidance into a repeatable business discipline—without requiring a data science degree. As artificial intelligence becomes a board-level priority, business leaders are increasingly accountable for managing its risks, yet much of the available guidance is written by engineers for technical audiences. The NIST AI Risk Management Framework (AI RMF) offers a common, practical approach that helps organizations translate AI risk guidance into business practices, establish accountability, strengthen governance, and support responsible innovation. Here’s what the framework is, why it is increasingly becoming an expected standard, and how business leaders can begin putting it into practice today. This is based on my 29-page white paper, which has amassed almost 21,000 views!

Key takeaways

• It’s a cycle, not a project. Four functions (Govern, Map, Measure, Manage) run continuously across an AI system’s whole life.

• Voluntary in name only. Regulators, insurers, and enterprise customers increasingly treat it as the reference point.

• A credible program takes about a year. Start with governance and an inventory, not technical testing.

• The top failure mode is treating the framework as a checklist, or testing before anyone owns the results.

• Alignment ≠ compliance ≠ risk reduction. Frameworks give the work a defensible shape. They don’t do the work.

Why this belongs on the leadership agenda:

NIST published the AI RMF (NIST AI 100-1) in January 2023 as voluntary guidance for any organization that builds, buys, or simply uses AI. Its core is organized into four functions with roughly seventy specific outcomes, and it is explicitly meant to be tailored rather than adopted wholesale.

It is tempting to hand AI risk to IT. That instinct is wrong. The framework’s Govern function is about leadership, accountability, and culture: decisions only the business can make. And the pressure to act comes from every direction: regulators referencing “recognized frameworks,” procurement questionnaires asking whether vendors have adopted the AI RMF, insurers pricing in governance maturity, and the EU AI Act, whose high-risk requirements closely mirror the framework’s structure.

History is instructive. NIST’s Cybersecurity Framework launched as voluntary guidance in 2014 and became a de facto requirement long before most organizations treated it that way. The AI RMF is on the same path, even as the rules beneath it shift. Colorado’s first-in-the-nation AI law was repealed and replaced in May 2026 with a narrower disclosure law taking effect in 2027. At the federal level, OMB rewrote its AI memoranda in 2025, yet both new memos still point to NIST for the technical substance. The lesson: specific statutes change, so revisit any legal citation regularly. The framework is the stable anchor.

The four functions in plain language:

The NIST AI Risk Management Framework is organized around four core functions: Govern, Map, Measure, and Manage. Together, they provide organizations with a practical structure for establishing accountability, understanding AI-related risks, evaluating control effectiveness, and responding to identified issues.

Govern establishes the leadership, policies, and accountability structures that support everything else. It answers: Who is accountable, and what rules govern the organization’s use of AI? Map involves developing a comprehensive inventory of AI systems and understanding their business purpose, operating environment, and potential risks. It answers: What AI systems do we have, how are they being used, and where could things go wrong? Measure focuses on evaluating AI systems against defined metrics, including bias, accuracy, performance drift, and explainability. It answers: How do we know our controls are working, and can we demonstrate that the technology is performing as intended? Finally, Manage translates those findings into action through risk mitigation, ongoing monitoring, remediation, or retirement of systems when necessary. It answers: What do we do about the risks and weaknesses we’ve identified?

These four functions apply throughout an AI system’s lifecycle, from initial planning and procurement through development, deployment, ongoing monitoring, and eventual retirement. An AI model that passes testing at launch may perform very differently 18 months later as underlying data changes, operating conditions evolve, or a vendor quietly updates its model. Risk management cannot be treated as a one-time approval exercise; it requires continuous oversight. The framework also emphasizes clearly defined roles and responsibilities. Data providers, developers, testers, deployers, operators, and end users all contribute to AI risk management. In practice, many control gaps emerge not because organizations lack policies or technology, but because responsibility for a particular risk was never clearly assigned to anyone.

Step one: build governance, then know what you have:

The NIST AI RMF Operationalized infographic by Jeremy Swenson
Fig. 2. The NIST AI RMF Operationalized Infographic, Jeremy Swenson, 11/08/26.

Govern comes first because the other functions have nowhere to report without it. You need written answers to four questions: Who is accountable (a named person with budget and authority, not a committee name)? Which policies cover how AI is built, bought, and deployed? How does AI risk connect to enterprise risk management? And what is your risk tolerance? Many organizations borrow the familiar “three lines of defense”: the business owns the risk, a risk or compliance function sets policy and challenges it, and internal audit tests both.

Map starts with a complete inventory, and the most common mistake is scope. Organizations catalog what they built and forget what they bought: the HR resume screener, the marketing content generator, the AI feature switched on inside existing SaaS. Unsanctioned “shadow AI” use of consumer tools by staff belongs on the radar too. For each system, record what it does, what data it touches, who it affects, and which decisions it influences. Then assign a risk tier: high (credit, hiring, medical), medium (customer chatbots, scheduling), or low (email sorting, document search). Resist bringing everything to full compliance at once; that path leads to paralysis.

Step two: measure what matters, then act on it:

Measure turns qualitative concerns into numbers you define in advance: disparity across demographic groups, accuracy against ground truth and drift over time, whether users can understand and challenge outputs, and for generative AI, how often it confidently states things that are false. If accuracy slips from 94 to 87 percent, you want to know before your customers do. Internal testing is necessary but not sufficient. Independent audits and red-teaming catch blind spots and carry more weight with regulators and customers.

Manage is the response. Decide ahead of time whether to mitigate, accept, transfer, or avoid each risk, and document why. Define incident escalation paths, build monitoring into daily operations rather than an annual review, and keep a real process for retiring systems, including data retention and transition planning.

The risk areas leaders get asked about:

Leaders should pay particular attention to several emerging AI risk areas. For generative AI, organizations should use NIST’s Generative AI Profile (AI 600-1) to guide risk management. This includes monitoring for confabulation and information leakage and conducting ongoing red-team testing rather than limiting assessments to the pre-launch phase.

Third-party vendor risk requires additional scrutiny. Organizations should understand what data was used to train a model, whether their proprietary data will be used for retraining, and what happens when a vendor changes its underlying models. Audit rights and advance notification of material changes should be negotiated before signing agreements. Cybersecurity teams should also incorporate AI-specific threats, including prompt injection, model inversion, and data poisoning, into existing security programs. Frameworks such as NIST SP 800-218A and MITRE ATLAS can help identify, assess, and address these evolving threats.

Privacy and model risk management practices should extend to AI training and inference data. Organizations should maintain independent model validation and appropriate board visibility, even where newer banking guidance provides exceptions or different treatment for generative AI. Human oversight should reflect the level of risk involved: high-risk decisions warrant a human in the loop, medium-risk decisions require human oversight, and lower-risk applications can rely on periodic spot checks. Organizations should also test whether employees have the authority and ability to override AI decisions before an actual incident occurs.

Incident management is another critical consideration. Organizations should establish their own definitions of reportable AI incidents, identify who must be notified and within what timeframe, and ensure lessons learned translate into updated policies and controls.

Finally, don’t overlook your own engineers. As AI coding assistants generate more production code, organizations need current architecture documentation to serve as ground truth. AI-assisted code changes should be validated against established architecture and design requirements, not simply accepted because automated tests pass.

Proof it works at scale:

In February 2026, the Cyber Risk Institute released the Financial Services AI Risk Management Framework, built with more than 100 institutions and input from regulators including NIST. It doesn’t replace the AI RMF; it operationalizes it, expanding the four functions into 230 control objectives. A short questionnaire sorts each institution into an adoption stage, so a community bank piloting one chatbot isn’t held to the same bar as a global bank running dozens of models. Three lessons travel to any industry: translate the functions into auditable controls, integrate with frameworks you already run, and scope requirements to actual maturity.

Alignment, compliance, and risk reduction are three different things:

The AI RMF is designed to plug into what you already have, not to compete with it. It interoperates with NIST’s Cybersecurity and Privacy Frameworks, maps clause-by-clause to ISO/IEC 23894, pairs with certifiable ISO/IEC 42001, and fits naturally into COBIT governance and SOC 2 controls. A useful shorthand: NIST answers the what and why of AI risk, while ISO answers the how of proving you did it consistently.

But this is the most consequential misunderstanding in the space: adopting the AI RMF does not make you compliant with the EU AI Act, HIPAA, or a state automated-decision law, each of which carries its own requirements. Even an ISO 42001 certificate confirms that a management system exists and is followed, not that every decision inside it was right. The real risk management is the bias testing, red-teaming, monitoring, incident response, and human review. Frameworks make that work defensible. They are not a substitute for it.

How to know it’s working:

NIST’s own Implementation Tiers offer a built-in maturity model, from Tier 1 (Partial, reactive and informal) to Tier 4 (Adaptive, continuously improving). Most organizations start between Tiers 1 and 2, which is fine. The goal is not Tier 4 everywhere; high-risk systems should move toward Tiers 3 and 4, while a low-risk internal tool may never need more than Tier 2. Track movement over time, not a static score, and revisit the program at least semi-annually or whenever technology, threats, regulations, or risk appetite change.

Pair that with a short, decision-oriented report rather than dashboard theater. Useful monthly and quarterly measures include:

• Inventory coverage: share of known AI systems with a completed risk tier.

• Testing currency: share of high-risk systems tested within policy windows.

• Human override rate: a rate near zero can signal rubber-stamp review, not a perfect model.

• Overdue remediation, incidents by severity, and vendor attestations on file.

• Shadow AI discoveries: tools found in use that never entered the inventory.

Your next step:

Don’t try to implement all four functions at once. Name one accountable owner this week and give that person thirty days to produce a first-draft inventory of every AI system in use. Everything else (risk tiering, testing, response plans, framework mapping, metrics) has somewhere to attach once that exists.

The organizations that struggle are rarely the ones that started imperfectly. They are the ones that waited for a mandate that arrived quietly, as a lost contract, a denied insurance claim, or a regulator’s question they couldn’t answer with documentation. Momentum, not completeness, is what turns this framework from a document on a shelf into an operating discipline.

Where is your organization on this journey: still building the inventory, or already measuring? Share what’s working (and what isn’t) in the comments.

#AIGovernance #NISTAIRMF #RiskManagement #ResponsibleAI #Cybersecurity #AIRisk

NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) New Version 2.0 Summary

Fig. 1. NIST CSF 2.0 Stepper, NIST, 2024.

#cyberresilience #cybersecurity #generativeai #cyberthreats #enterprisearchitecture #CIO #CTO #riskmanagement #bias #governance #RBAC #CybersecurityFramework #Cybersecurity #NISTCSF #RiskManagement #DigitalResilience #nist #nistframework #cyberawareness

The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has updated its widely used Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) — a free respected landmark guidance document for reducing cybersecurity risk. However, it’s important to note that most of the framework core has remained the same. Here are the core components the security community knows:

Govern (GV): Sets forth the strategic path and guidelines for managing cybersecurity risks, ensuring harmony with business goals and adherence to legal requirements and standards. This is the newest addition which was inferred before but is specifically illustrated to touch every aspect of the framework. It seeks to establish and monitor your company’s cybersecurity risk management strategy, expectations, and policy.

1.      Identify (ID): Entails cultivating a comprehensive organizational comprehension of managing cybersecurity risks to systems, assets, data, and capabilities.

2.      Protect (PR): Concentrates on deploying suitable measures to guarantee the provision of vital services.

3.      Detect (DE): Specifies the actions for recognizing the onset of a cybersecurity incident.

4.      Respond (RS): Outlines the actions to take in the event of a cybersecurity incident.

5.      Recover (RC): Focuses on restoring capabilities or services that were impaired due to a cybersecurity incident.

The new 2.0 edition is structured for all audiences, industry sectors, and organization types, from the smallest startups and nonprofits to the largest corporations and government departments — regardless of their level of cybersecurity preparedness and complexity.

Fig. 2. NIST CSF 2.0 Function Breakdown, NIST, 2024.

Here are some key updates:

Emphasis is placed on the framework’s expanded scope, extending beyond critical infrastructure to encompass all organizations. Importantly, it better incorporates and expands upon supply chain risk management processes. It also introduces a new focus on governance, highlighting cybersecurity as a critical enterprise risk with many dependencies. This is critically important with the emergence of artificial intelligence.

To make it easier for a wide variety of organizations to implement the CSF 2.0, NIST has developed quick-start guides customized for various audiences, along with case studies showcasing successful implementations, and a searchable catalog of references, all aimed at facilitating the adoption of CSF 2.0 by diverse organizations.

The CSF 2.0 is aligned with the National Cybersecurity Strategy and includes a suite of resources to adapt to evolving cybersecurity needs, emphasizing a comprehensive approach to managing cybersecurity risk. New adopters can benefit from implementation examples and quick-start guides tailored to specific user types, facilitating easier integration into their cybersecurity practices. The CSF 2.0 Reference Tool simplifies implementation, enabling users to access, search, and export core guidance data in user-friendly and machine-readable formats. A searchable catalog of references allows organizations to cross-reference their actions with the CSF, linking to over 50 other cybersecurity documents – facilitating comprehensive risk management. The Cybersecurity and Privacy Reference Tool (CPRT) contextualizes NIST resources with other popular references, facilitating communication across all levels of an organization.

NIST aims to continually enhance CSF resources based on community feedback, encouraging users to share their experiences to improve collective understanding and management of cybersecurity risk. The CSF’s international adoption is significant, with translations of previous versions into 13 languages. NIST expects CSF 2.0 to follow suit, further expanding its global reach. NIST’s collaboration with ISO/IEC aligns cybersecurity frameworks internationally, enabling organizations to utilize CSF functions in conjunction with ISO/IEC resources for comprehensive cybersecurity management.

Resources:

  1. NIST CSF 2.0 Fact Sheet.
  2. NIST CSF 2.0 PDF.
  3. NIST CSF 2.0 Reference Tool.
  4. NIST CSF 2.0 YouTube Breakdown.

About the Author:

Jeremy Swenson is a disruptive-thinking security entrepreneur, futurist/researcher, and senior management tech risk consultant. He is a frequent speaker, published writer, podcaster, and even does some pro bono consulting in these areas. He holds an MBA from St. Mary’s University of MN, an MSST (Master of Science in Security Technologies) degree from the University of Minnesota, and a BA in political science from the University of Wisconsin Eau Claire. He is an alum of the Federal Reserve Secure Payment Task Force, the Crystal, Robbinsdale and New Hope Citizens Police Academy, and the Minneapolis FBI Citizens Academy.

Lessons Learned From the Sony Hack

President Barack Obama speaking at a podium to a packed White House briefing room during his December 19, 2014 press conference.

President Obama at his year-end press conference, where he addressed the Sony Pictures hack, December 19, 2014. Official White House Photo by Chuck Kennedy, public domain, via Wikimedia Commons.

This article reviews the 2014 Sony hack from a strengths and weaknesses standpoint based on select parts of the SysAdmin, Audit, Network and Security (SANS) and National Institute of Standards in Technology (NIST) frameworks. Although an older hack, the lessons learned here are still relevant today.

Strengths – A Track Record of Innovation and Multilayered Information Security:
From early boom-boxes in the 1980s to the first portable disc player in the early 1990s.  To high-quality headphones, the first HD TVs, to high-quality speakers, a gaming system revolution called the PlayStation, and now a massive on-line gaming network, Sony has been creative and innovative.  This has made them one of the most respected and profitable Japanese companies to date.  Yet this success derived overconfidence in other areas including information security but they still have the potential and the money to be a security leader.   The managerial layering of Sony’s information security team was a good start even if their head count was too low.  One source stated, “Three information security analysts are overseen by three managers, three directors, one executive director and one senior vice president” (Hill, 2014).  Although contradictory, at least there was some oversight.

Failure 1 – Poor Culture and Lack of Leadership Support:
Sony’s leadership is on the record as not respecting the recommendations of either internal or external auditors.  A quote from an I.T. risk consultancy summarized it this way, “The Executive Director of Information Security talked auditors out of reporting failures related to Access Controls which would have resulted in Sony being SOX (Sarbanes-Oxley) non-compliant in 2005” (Risk3sixty LLC, 2014).  Things like this trickle down the layers of management and become a part of the company culture.  Specifically, low level whistle blowers were silenced even though their I.T. risk arguments were solid.  “Sony’s own employees complained that the network security was a joke. (Risk3sixty LLC, 2014)”.  When this happened Sony’s leaders failed to execute their fiduciary duty to the board, shareholders, and customers.  They did this so they did not look bad in the short term yet it cost the company more in the long term.

Failure 2 – Not Understanding Their Baseline:
The baseline is a measure that determines when you have the right amount of security and security process in relationship to your required business objectives and risk tolerance.  Being below the baseline means risk is too high and an attack or breach is likely.  This is why the baseline changes often and needs to be closely monitored.  For example, when you are producing a very politically controversial movie about an unruly world leader who has a history of making war threats against his political opponents, you should have a higher baseline to be on guard from hacktivists.  Sony overly focused on their cash generating core competencies and security was at most an afterthought.  According to one source, Sony Pictures had just 11 people assigned to a top-heavy information security team out of 7,000 total employees (Hill, 2014).  For a technology company that is way too few people working in security.  It’s not enough people to collect and intelligently review logs, patch software, pen test, red team, and be available for one or more war room type projects which are bound to come up – all things prudent security would require.

Understanding your I.T. risk baseline requires testing and measurement and this has to be based on some framework, SANS, NIST, or some of the others.  One former employee described Sony’s failure to comply with any framework as follows, “The real problem lies in the fact that there was no real investment in or real understanding of what information security is.  One issue made evident by the leak is that sensitive files on the Sony Pictures network were not encrypted internally or password-protected” (Hill, 2014).  Had they conformed to the SANS or NIST framework they would have been required to encrypt the data – see conclusion.

Failure 3 – Weak Password Policies:
Sony’s password policy was embarrassingly weak.  In fact, so weak you might think they were deliberately trying to help hackers.  “Employees kept plaintext passwords in Microsoft Word documents” (Franceschi-Bicchierai, 2014).  Even very small companies from the 1990s would have policies against that.  Moreover, one source confirmed that the word files were named with password in the file name (Risk3sixty LLC, 2014).  Once in the network, all a hacker has to do is search for a file with password in the name and they have it.

Failure 4 – Late Detecting the Hack and Data Exfiltration:
Right away the intruders easily walked into Sony’s internal network and began stealing unencrypted sensitive data with apparently no log alarms going off.  Sony had not followed data classification, retention, or governance plans – not even checkbox compliance.  If they did they would not have had all types of data mixed together.  One reporter described it this way, “Intruders got access to movie budgets, salary information, Social Security numbers, health care files, unreleased films, and more” (Hill, 2014).  Thus, their network segmentation here must have been weak or non-existent.  Health care data should not be near unreleased film files as they are totally different.  There is no business justification for this.  Segmenting and encrypting the data would have greatly reduced and delayed any data theft.

Conclusion:
sans-top-3-sony
nist-cyber-sec-framework-for-sony

References:
Baker, L., & Finkle, J.  “Sony PlayStation suffers massive data breach”.  Reuters.  Published 04/26/11.  Viewed 10/26/16.  http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/26/us-sonystoldendata-idUSTRE73P6WB20110426

Franceschi-Bicchierai, Lorenzo.  “Don’t believe the hype: Sony hack not ‘unprecedented,’ experts say.”  Mashable.  Published 12/08/14.  Viewed 10/20/16.  http://mashable.com/2014/12/08/sony-hack-unprecedented-undetectable/#359BD06aEkq6

Greene, Tim.  “SANS: 20 critical security controls you need to add.” Networked world.  Published 10/13/15.  Viewed 10/23/16.  http://www.networkworld.com/article/2992503/security/sans-20-critical-security-controls-you-need-to-add.html

Hill, Kashmir.  “Sony Pictures hack was a long time coming, say former employees”.  Published 12/04/14.  Viewed 10/20/16.  http://fusion.net/story/31469/sony-pictures-hack-was-a-long-time-coming-say-former-employees/

NIST.  “Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cyber Security”.  Published 01/01/2016.  Viewed 10/23/16. https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cyberframework/Cybersecurity-Framework-for-FCSM-Jan-2016.pdf Risk3sixty LLC.

Risk3sixty. “The Sony Hack – Security Failures and Solutions.”  Published 12/19/14.  Viewed 10/20/16. http://www.risk3sixty.com/2014/12/19/the-sony-hack-security-failures-and-solutions/

Sanchez, Gabriel.  “Case Study: Critical Controls that Sony Should Have Implemented”.  SANS Institute Information security Reading Room.  Published 06/01/2015.  Viewed 10/20/16.  https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/casestudies/case-study-critical-controls-sony-implemented-36022