From Shelf to Practice: Making the NIST AI Risk Framework Work for Your Business

Cover graphic for From Shelf to Practice: Making the NIST AI Risk Framework Work for Your Business
Fig. 1. NIST AI RMF Article Infographic, Jeremy Swenson, 11/14/2026.

AI GOVERNANCE · RISK MANAGEMENT

A leader’s playbook for turning voluntary AI guidance into a repeatable business discipline—without requiring a data science degree. As artificial intelligence becomes a board-level priority, business leaders are increasingly accountable for managing its risks, yet much of the available guidance is written by engineers for technical audiences. The NIST AI Risk Management Framework (AI RMF) offers a common, practical approach that helps organizations translate AI risk guidance into business practices, establish accountability, strengthen governance, and support responsible innovation. Here’s what the framework is, why it is increasingly becoming an expected standard, and how business leaders can begin putting it into practice today. This is based on my 29-page white paper, which has amassed almost 21,000 views!

Key takeaways

• It’s a cycle, not a project. Four functions (Govern, Map, Measure, Manage) run continuously across an AI system’s whole life.

• Voluntary in name only. Regulators, insurers, and enterprise customers increasingly treat it as the reference point.

• A credible program takes about a year. Start with governance and an inventory, not technical testing.

• The top failure mode is treating the framework as a checklist, or testing before anyone owns the results.

• Alignment ≠ compliance ≠ risk reduction. Frameworks give the work a defensible shape. They don’t do the work.

Why this belongs on the leadership agenda:

NIST published the AI RMF (NIST AI 100-1) in January 2023 as voluntary guidance for any organization that builds, buys, or simply uses AI. Its core is organized into four functions with roughly seventy specific outcomes, and it is explicitly meant to be tailored rather than adopted wholesale.

It is tempting to hand AI risk to IT. That instinct is wrong. The framework’s Govern function is about leadership, accountability, and culture: decisions only the business can make. And the pressure to act comes from every direction: regulators referencing “recognized frameworks,” procurement questionnaires asking whether vendors have adopted the AI RMF, insurers pricing in governance maturity, and the EU AI Act, whose high-risk requirements closely mirror the framework’s structure.

History is instructive. NIST’s Cybersecurity Framework launched as voluntary guidance in 2014 and became a de facto requirement long before most organizations treated it that way. The AI RMF is on the same path, even as the rules beneath it shift. Colorado’s first-in-the-nation AI law was repealed and replaced in May 2026 with a narrower disclosure law taking effect in 2027. At the federal level, OMB rewrote its AI memoranda in 2025, yet both new memos still point to NIST for the technical substance. The lesson: specific statutes change, so revisit any legal citation regularly. The framework is the stable anchor.

The four functions in plain language:

The NIST AI Risk Management Framework is organized around four core functions: Govern, Map, Measure, and Manage. Together, they provide organizations with a practical structure for establishing accountability, understanding AI-related risks, evaluating control effectiveness, and responding to identified issues.

Govern establishes the leadership, policies, and accountability structures that support everything else. It answers: Who is accountable, and what rules govern the organization’s use of AI? Map involves developing a comprehensive inventory of AI systems and understanding their business purpose, operating environment, and potential risks. It answers: What AI systems do we have, how are they being used, and where could things go wrong? Measure focuses on evaluating AI systems against defined metrics, including bias, accuracy, performance drift, and explainability. It answers: How do we know our controls are working, and can we demonstrate that the technology is performing as intended? Finally, Manage translates those findings into action through risk mitigation, ongoing monitoring, remediation, or retirement of systems when necessary. It answers: What do we do about the risks and weaknesses we’ve identified?

These four functions apply throughout an AI system’s lifecycle, from initial planning and procurement through development, deployment, ongoing monitoring, and eventual retirement. An AI model that passes testing at launch may perform very differently 18 months later as underlying data changes, operating conditions evolve, or a vendor quietly updates its model. Risk management cannot be treated as a one-time approval exercise; it requires continuous oversight. The framework also emphasizes clearly defined roles and responsibilities. Data providers, developers, testers, deployers, operators, and end users all contribute to AI risk management. In practice, many control gaps emerge not because organizations lack policies or technology, but because responsibility for a particular risk was never clearly assigned to anyone.

Step one: build governance, then know what you have:

The NIST AI RMF Operationalized infographic by Jeremy Swenson
Fig. 2. The NIST AI RMF Operationalized Infographic, Jeremy Swenson, 11/08/26.

Govern comes first because the other functions have nowhere to report without it. You need written answers to four questions: Who is accountable (a named person with budget and authority, not a committee name)? Which policies cover how AI is built, bought, and deployed? How does AI risk connect to enterprise risk management? And what is your risk tolerance? Many organizations borrow the familiar “three lines of defense”: the business owns the risk, a risk or compliance function sets policy and challenges it, and internal audit tests both.

Map starts with a complete inventory, and the most common mistake is scope. Organizations catalog what they built and forget what they bought: the HR resume screener, the marketing content generator, the AI feature switched on inside existing SaaS. Unsanctioned “shadow AI” use of consumer tools by staff belongs on the radar too. For each system, record what it does, what data it touches, who it affects, and which decisions it influences. Then assign a risk tier: high (credit, hiring, medical), medium (customer chatbots, scheduling), or low (email sorting, document search). Resist bringing everything to full compliance at once; that path leads to paralysis.

Step two: measure what matters, then act on it:

Measure turns qualitative concerns into numbers you define in advance: disparity across demographic groups, accuracy against ground truth and drift over time, whether users can understand and challenge outputs, and for generative AI, how often it confidently states things that are false. If accuracy slips from 94 to 87 percent, you want to know before your customers do. Internal testing is necessary but not sufficient. Independent audits and red-teaming catch blind spots and carry more weight with regulators and customers.

Manage is the response. Decide ahead of time whether to mitigate, accept, transfer, or avoid each risk, and document why. Define incident escalation paths, build monitoring into daily operations rather than an annual review, and keep a real process for retiring systems, including data retention and transition planning.

The risk areas leaders get asked about:

Leaders should pay particular attention to several emerging AI risk areas. For generative AI, organizations should use NIST’s Generative AI Profile (AI 600-1) to guide risk management. This includes monitoring for confabulation and information leakage and conducting ongoing red-team testing rather than limiting assessments to the pre-launch phase.

Third-party vendor risk requires additional scrutiny. Organizations should understand what data was used to train a model, whether their proprietary data will be used for retraining, and what happens when a vendor changes its underlying models. Audit rights and advance notification of material changes should be negotiated before signing agreements. Cybersecurity teams should also incorporate AI-specific threats, including prompt injection, model inversion, and data poisoning, into existing security programs. Frameworks such as NIST SP 800-218A and MITRE ATLAS can help identify, assess, and address these evolving threats.

Privacy and model risk management practices should extend to AI training and inference data. Organizations should maintain independent model validation and appropriate board visibility, even where newer banking guidance provides exceptions or different treatment for generative AI. Human oversight should reflect the level of risk involved: high-risk decisions warrant a human in the loop, medium-risk decisions require human oversight, and lower-risk applications can rely on periodic spot checks. Organizations should also test whether employees have the authority and ability to override AI decisions before an actual incident occurs.

Incident management is another critical consideration. Organizations should establish their own definitions of reportable AI incidents, identify who must be notified and within what timeframe, and ensure lessons learned translate into updated policies and controls.

Finally, don’t overlook your own engineers. As AI coding assistants generate more production code, organizations need current architecture documentation to serve as ground truth. AI-assisted code changes should be validated against established architecture and design requirements, not simply accepted because automated tests pass.

Proof it works at scale:

In February 2026, the Cyber Risk Institute released the Financial Services AI Risk Management Framework, built with more than 100 institutions and input from regulators including NIST. It doesn’t replace the AI RMF; it operationalizes it, expanding the four functions into 230 control objectives. A short questionnaire sorts each institution into an adoption stage, so a community bank piloting one chatbot isn’t held to the same bar as a global bank running dozens of models. Three lessons travel to any industry: translate the functions into auditable controls, integrate with frameworks you already run, and scope requirements to actual maturity.

Alignment, compliance, and risk reduction are three different things:

The AI RMF is designed to plug into what you already have, not to compete with it. It interoperates with NIST’s Cybersecurity and Privacy Frameworks, maps clause-by-clause to ISO/IEC 23894, pairs with certifiable ISO/IEC 42001, and fits naturally into COBIT governance and SOC 2 controls. A useful shorthand: NIST answers the what and why of AI risk, while ISO answers the how of proving you did it consistently.

But this is the most consequential misunderstanding in the space: adopting the AI RMF does not make you compliant with the EU AI Act, HIPAA, or a state automated-decision law, each of which carries its own requirements. Even an ISO 42001 certificate confirms that a management system exists and is followed, not that every decision inside it was right. The real risk management is the bias testing, red-teaming, monitoring, incident response, and human review. Frameworks make that work defensible. They are not a substitute for it.

How to know it’s working:

NIST’s own Implementation Tiers offer a built-in maturity model, from Tier 1 (Partial, reactive and informal) to Tier 4 (Adaptive, continuously improving). Most organizations start between Tiers 1 and 2, which is fine. The goal is not Tier 4 everywhere; high-risk systems should move toward Tiers 3 and 4, while a low-risk internal tool may never need more than Tier 2. Track movement over time, not a static score, and revisit the program at least semi-annually or whenever technology, threats, regulations, or risk appetite change.

Pair that with a short, decision-oriented report rather than dashboard theater. Useful monthly and quarterly measures include:

• Inventory coverage: share of known AI systems with a completed risk tier.

• Testing currency: share of high-risk systems tested within policy windows.

• Human override rate: a rate near zero can signal rubber-stamp review, not a perfect model.

• Overdue remediation, incidents by severity, and vendor attestations on file.

• Shadow AI discoveries: tools found in use that never entered the inventory.

Your next step:

Don’t try to implement all four functions at once. Name one accountable owner this week and give that person thirty days to produce a first-draft inventory of every AI system in use. Everything else (risk tiering, testing, response plans, framework mapping, metrics) has somewhere to attach once that exists.

The organizations that struggle are rarely the ones that started imperfectly. They are the ones that waited for a mandate that arrived quietly, as a lost contract, a denied insurance claim, or a regulator’s question they couldn’t answer with documentation. Momentum, not completeness, is what turns this framework from a document on a shelf into an operating discipline.

Where is your organization on this journey: still building the inventory, or already measuring? Share what’s working (and what isn’t) in the comments.

#AIGovernance #NISTAIRMF #RiskManagement #ResponsibleAI #Cybersecurity #AIRisk

From Mythos to Mechanics: How Frontier AI Policy Shifts Are Rewriting Enterprise Governance

Fig. 1. Infographic Title: From Mythos to Mechanics, Generic/Rights Free, Jeremy Swenson, 2026.

The recent decision to lift restrictions on advanced model deployments from Anthropic represents more than a policy adjustment or regulatory softening. It signals a deeper transition in how frontier AI systems are being treated by governments, enterprises, and oversight bodies: not as static technologies that can be approved or denied once, but as dynamic systems whose behavior, risk profile, and operational impact evolve continuously over time. The significance of this shift is not fully captured in headlines focused on access restoration. Instead, it lies in the subtle but consequential rebalancing of responsibility—from centralized gatekeepers to distributed operators embedded inside enterprise systems.¹

This shift is unfolding alongside a broader geopolitical reclassification of AI systems as controlled strategic infrastructure. As reported by Forbes, the U.S. administration recently lifted export controls on Anthropic’s Mythos 5 and Fable 5 models following a period of heightened national security concern and temporary suspension of access.² Reuters similarly reports that this pattern reflects a new regulatory rhythm: rapid restriction, negotiated mitigation, and conditional restoration rather than permanent prohibition.³ These oscillations are not anomalies—they are becoming the governing structure itself.

At the same time, this policy volatility is occurring against a broader global consolidation of scientific consensus on AI risk. The International AI Safety Report 2026 emphasizes that AI capabilities are advancing faster than safety practices and institutional governance can reliably track.⁴ The report highlights that frontier systems are increasingly autonomous in workflow execution, capable of multi-step reasoning, and difficult to evaluate using static benchmarks alone.⁴ Importantly, it concludes that governance systems are now largely reactive rather than anticipatory, with safety controls lagging behind deployment realities.⁴

More critically, the report identifies a structural mismatch between capability growth and institutional oversight capacity. It notes that frontier AI systems are not improving linearly, but through discontinuous capability jumps driven by scaling, tool use, and inference-time computation.⁴ This creates evaluation blind spots where systems appear safe in testing environments but exhibit materially different behaviors once deployed.

At the core of this transition is a change in what “control” means. Earlier governance models around frontier AI were built on relatively familiar assumptions drawn from software regulation, export controls, and cloud security certification regimes. If a system passed evaluation thresholds, it could be deployed; if it failed, it was restricted or segmented. That logic worked reasonably well when system behavior was stable, deterministic, and tightly scoped. However, frontier AI systems increasingly violate those assumptions. Their outputs are probabilistic, their capabilities shift with prompting techniques, and their risk surfaces expand as they are embedded into broader enterprise ecosystems.⁴

The International AI Safety Report explicitly warns that pre-deployment evaluation alone is insufficient for safety assurance, particularly in systems with tool access, memory, or agentic capabilities.⁴ It recommends continuous post-deployment monitoring as a core governance requirement rather than an optional enhancement.

What emerges instead is a governance posture that resembles continuous assurance rather than static certification. Access becomes conditional, contextual, and dynamic. The report emphasizes the importance of real-world monitoring systems capable of detecting behavioral drift and emergent capabilities after deployment, reinforcing the idea that governance must move into runtime systems rather than remain in pre-release gates.⁴

As these systems return to broader availability, another structural shift becomes visible: the migration of governance responsibility away from regulators and model developers and into enterprise architecture itself. Historically, AI safety and capability constraints were enforced upstream. That separation is eroding rapidly.

Reuters reporting on export control reversals underscores how government decisions are now shaping model availability in near real time, creating a governance environment defined by rapid policy iteration rather than stable regulation.³ Meanwhile, the International AI Safety Report highlights that this instability is mirrored in deployment environments, where inconsistent governance maturity across organizations and jurisdictions creates asymmetric risk exposure.⁴

This downstream shift places new pressure on enterprise functions simultaneously. Cybersecurity teams must model AI behavior as part of threat landscapes. Third-party risk teams must evaluate emergent model behavior, not just vendor controls. Data governance teams must account for indirect leakage pathways through prompts and outputs. Product teams now actively shape risk through interface design, workflow orchestration, and agentic integration choices.

The International AI Safety Report reinforces this transformation by documenting how frontier AI systems are increasingly deployed in agentic configurations, where models execute multi-step tasks, use external tools, and operate with partial autonomy.⁴ These systems blur the line between software and actor, fundamentally altering traditional control assumptions.

Compounding this challenge is the fact that frameworks such as NIST AI RMF and ISO/IEC 42001 assume bounded, testable system behavior. The International AI Safety Report directly challenges this assumption, noting that emergent behaviors often appear only after real-world deployment under complex and shifting conditions.⁴

In cybersecurity contexts, this shift is already visible. The report documents growing evidence of AI systems being used for vulnerability discovery, phishing automation, and large-scale social engineering.⁴ These are not hypothetical risks—they are operational realities emerging in parallel with deployment expansion.

One of the most important but least discussed consequences of this shift is the transformation of AI systems into dynamic or “living” risk surfaces. Unlike traditional software, which changes primarily through version updates, AI systems can change behavior based on context, tool access, and input distribution.⁴ A retrieval-augmented system, for example, may introduce entirely different risk profiles than a base model operating in isolation.

The International AI Safety Report characterizes this as a form of non-stationary risk, where the system being evaluated is not stable over time.⁴ This fundamentally breaks traditional assumptions of static risk modeling. This introduces a shift in security thinking itself. Organizations must move from vulnerability-centric models to behavior-centric models. Weaknesses are no longer purely code-based—they are emergent, interaction-driven, and context-dependent.⁴

From a strategic perspective, the most important implication of expanded frontier model availability is not technical—it is competitive. Organizations that successfully integrate continuous AI governance into operational systems will deploy faster, scale broader, and take more strategic risk safely. Those that treat governance as a bottleneck will slow precisely when speed becomes advantage.

The International AI Safety Report explicitly identifies governance maturity and institutional readiness as key limiting factors in safe AI adoption at scale.⁴ This makes governance capability—not model access—the primary differentiator in enterprise AI maturity.

The next evolution of this landscape is the emergence of an AI control plane architecture: a unified layer that governs model access, routing, policy enforcement, behavioral monitoring, and auditability across environments. In this model, governance becomes infrastructure rather than documentation.

This represents a deeper shift in control theory itself. Static rules give way to continuous negotiation between capability and constraint. Periodic review gives way to continuous observation. Tools become ecosystems.

The lifting of restrictions on advanced models is therefore not an endpoint, but an early signal of a broader transition toward normalized frontier AI deployment under continuous governance conditions. The International AI Safety Report makes clear that this transition is already underway, driven by accelerating capabilities, uneven institutional readiness, and widening oversight gaps.⁴ The organizations that adapt early will not simply comply with this environment—they will define it.

Mitigation & Operational Readiness Playbook:

To translate the governance shift described in this analysis into actionable enterprise capability, organizations must move beyond fragmented controls and toward continuous, behavior-aware AI governance. The first priority is implementing continuous AI behavior monitoring. Rather than treating model evaluation as a pre-deployment checkpoint, enterprises need to track model outputs over time to detect drift, anomalies, and unexpected capability emergence. This effectively reframes AI telemetry as a core security signal, similar in importance to identity logs or network activity, rather than a secondary analytics layer.

In parallel, organizations must establish AI-specific threat modeling practices. Traditional cybersecurity frameworks are insufficient on their own because they assume deterministic system behavior. AI systems introduce new threat vectors such as prompt injection, tool misuse, data exfiltration through outputs, and unintended agentic behavior. These must be explicitly integrated into threat models, extending existing methodologies to account for probabilistic and context-sensitive system responses.

A critical structural requirement is the deployment of an AI control plane architecture. This layer should centralize governance across all models, vendors, and deployment environments. It should enforce consistent policy controls governing access, tool usage, and data exposure while enabling dynamic routing of model requests based on sensitivity, risk tier, and operational context. Without this unified control layer, organizations will struggle to maintain coherent governance across increasingly distributed AI systems.

Data boundary enforcement for large language model interactions also becomes essential. Sensitive information must be prevented from entering prompts unless properly classified and authorized, and all prompt and response flows should be logged to ensure auditability. In practice, this requires extending data loss prevention (DLP) concepts into generative AI pipelines, where the boundary between input, processing, and output is far more fluid than in traditional systems.

Organizations should also adopt post-deployment evaluation frameworks that move beyond static approval cycles. Instead of relying on one-time certification, AI systems must undergo continuous reassessment through red-teaming, adversarial testing, and behavior evaluation in production-like conditions. This allows organizations to identify emergent risks that only appear after models are exposed to real-world inputs, evolving workflows, and integrated toolchains.

Third-party risk management functions must also evolve. Vendor assessment can no longer focus solely on security posture, compliance checklists, or infrastructure controls. It must incorporate behavioral risk—how models actually perform once deployed in dynamic environments. This includes understanding update cycles, tool integrations, and the degree of transparency vendors provide around model behavior and safety limitations.

Agentic workflows represent another critical area of hardening. As models increasingly perform multi-step tasks and interact with external systems, organizations must enforce least-privilege principles on tool access and require human-in-the-loop controls for high-risk actions. These workflows should also be fully logged and treated as security-relevant events, enabling retrospective analysis of autonomous or semi-autonomous decision paths.

At a structural level, AI governance ownership must be elevated to the architectural tier of the enterprise. Responsibility should not be fragmented across cybersecurity, compliance, and product teams, but instead unified within enterprise architecture or security engineering functions that can enforce consistent governance patterns across systems. This alignment is necessary to avoid gaps created by siloed decision-making in highly interconnected AI environments.

Finally, organizations must develop dedicated AI incident response capabilities. These playbooks should define clear escalation paths for model misuse, anomalous behavior, or data leakage events involving AI systems. They should also include operational mechanisms for rapid rollback of model versions, disabling of tool integrations, and containment of affected workflows. In an environment where AI systems are continuously evolving, response speed becomes a critical determinant of organizational resilience.

Endnotes:

  1. Anthropic, frontier model deployment and safety policy communications, 2026.
  2. Siladitya Ray, “Trump Administration Lifts Export Controls on Anthropic’s Mythos 5 and Fable 5 AI Models,” Forbes, July 1, 2026, https://www.forbes.com/sites/siladityaray/2026/07/01/trump-administration-lifts-export-controls-on-anthropics-mythos-5-and-fable-5-ai-models/.
  3. Reuters, “U.S. Lifts Export Controls on Frontier AI Models Following Security Review,” June 2026.
  4. International AI Safety Report, International AI Safety Report 2026 (London: DSIT and international expert consortium, 2026), https://internationalaisafetyreport.org/.
  5. Siladitya Ray, Forbes reporting on U.S. frontier AI policy shift and export control reversal, 2026.

NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) New Version 2.0 Summary

Fig. 1. NIST CSF 2.0 Stepper, NIST, 2024.

#cyberresilience #cybersecurity #generativeai #cyberthreats #enterprisearchitecture #CIO #CTO #riskmanagement #bias #governance #RBAC #CybersecurityFramework #Cybersecurity #NISTCSF #RiskManagement #DigitalResilience #nist #nistframework #cyberawareness

The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has updated its widely used Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) — a free respected landmark guidance document for reducing cybersecurity risk. However, it’s important to note that most of the framework core has remained the same. Here are the core components the security community knows:

Govern (GV): Sets forth the strategic path and guidelines for managing cybersecurity risks, ensuring harmony with business goals and adherence to legal requirements and standards. This is the newest addition which was inferred before but is specifically illustrated to touch every aspect of the framework. It seeks to establish and monitor your company’s cybersecurity risk management strategy, expectations, and policy.

1.      Identify (ID): Entails cultivating a comprehensive organizational comprehension of managing cybersecurity risks to systems, assets, data, and capabilities.

2.      Protect (PR): Concentrates on deploying suitable measures to guarantee the provision of vital services.

3.      Detect (DE): Specifies the actions for recognizing the onset of a cybersecurity incident.

4.      Respond (RS): Outlines the actions to take in the event of a cybersecurity incident.

5.      Recover (RC): Focuses on restoring capabilities or services that were impaired due to a cybersecurity incident.

The new 2.0 edition is structured for all audiences, industry sectors, and organization types, from the smallest startups and nonprofits to the largest corporations and government departments — regardless of their level of cybersecurity preparedness and complexity.

Fig. 2. NIST CSF 2.0 Function Breakdown, NIST, 2024.

Here are some key updates:

Emphasis is placed on the framework’s expanded scope, extending beyond critical infrastructure to encompass all organizations. Importantly, it better incorporates and expands upon supply chain risk management processes. It also introduces a new focus on governance, highlighting cybersecurity as a critical enterprise risk with many dependencies. This is critically important with the emergence of artificial intelligence.

To make it easier for a wide variety of organizations to implement the CSF 2.0, NIST has developed quick-start guides customized for various audiences, along with case studies showcasing successful implementations, and a searchable catalog of references, all aimed at facilitating the adoption of CSF 2.0 by diverse organizations.

The CSF 2.0 is aligned with the National Cybersecurity Strategy and includes a suite of resources to adapt to evolving cybersecurity needs, emphasizing a comprehensive approach to managing cybersecurity risk. New adopters can benefit from implementation examples and quick-start guides tailored to specific user types, facilitating easier integration into their cybersecurity practices. The CSF 2.0 Reference Tool simplifies implementation, enabling users to access, search, and export core guidance data in user-friendly and machine-readable formats. A searchable catalog of references allows organizations to cross-reference their actions with the CSF, linking to over 50 other cybersecurity documents – facilitating comprehensive risk management. The Cybersecurity and Privacy Reference Tool (CPRT) contextualizes NIST resources with other popular references, facilitating communication across all levels of an organization.

NIST aims to continually enhance CSF resources based on community feedback, encouraging users to share their experiences to improve collective understanding and management of cybersecurity risk. The CSF’s international adoption is significant, with translations of previous versions into 13 languages. NIST expects CSF 2.0 to follow suit, further expanding its global reach. NIST’s collaboration with ISO/IEC aligns cybersecurity frameworks internationally, enabling organizations to utilize CSF functions in conjunction with ISO/IEC resources for comprehensive cybersecurity management.

Resources:

  1. NIST CSF 2.0 Fact Sheet.
  2. NIST CSF 2.0 PDF.
  3. NIST CSF 2.0 Reference Tool.
  4. NIST CSF 2.0 YouTube Breakdown.

About the Author:

Jeremy Swenson is a disruptive-thinking security entrepreneur, futurist/researcher, and senior management tech risk consultant. He is a frequent speaker, published writer, podcaster, and even does some pro bono consulting in these areas. He holds an MBA from St. Mary’s University of MN, an MSST (Master of Science in Security Technologies) degree from the University of Minnesota, and a BA in political science from the University of Wisconsin Eau Claire. He is an alum of the Federal Reserve Secure Payment Task Force, the Crystal, Robbinsdale and New Hope Citizens Police Academy, and the Minneapolis FBI Citizens Academy.

Key Updates to the NIST Cyber Security Framework

framework-01The first version of the NIST Cybersecurity Framework came about in Feb. 2014. In May 2017 President Donald Trump issued an executive order directing all federal agencies to use the framework to manage this risk, including future versions. Conversely, the private sector more so uses it as a non-uniform guide (sometimes in part) when needed. They use other more industry specific frameworks as well. On 04/17/18 NIST released the updated version of this standard-setting framework. We attended the NIST hosted webcast reviewing this on 04/27/18 and my key points are:

Framework 7 Step Process:

1)    Prioritize and Scope: Implementation tiers may be used to express varying risk tolerances.
2)    Orient
3)    Create a Current Profile
4)    Conduct a Risk Assessment
5)    Create a Target Profile: When used in conjunction with an Implementation Tier, characteristics of the Tier level should be reflected in the desired cybersecurity outcomes.
6)    Determine, Analyze, and Prioritize Gaps
7)    Implementation Action Plan

These recent changes to the framework are based on feedback collected through public calls for comments, questions received by team members, and workshops held from 2016 to 2017.

NIST Cyber Security Framework 3 Areas

The newest version (1.1) includes these updates:

1)    Clarifies utility as a structure and language for organizing and expressing compliance with an organization’s own cyber security requirements.

2)    Added a new section for self-assessing cybersecurity risk which explains how organizations can use the framework. Emphasizes the role of measurements in self-assessment stresses critical linkage of business results:

  • Cost
  • Benefit
  • to cybersecurity risk management
  • Continued discussion of this linkage will occur under
  • Roadmap area – Measuring Cybersecurity

3)    Added a new section for supply chain risk management which focuses on identifying, assessing, and mitigating acquired products and services that may contain malicious functionality, be counterfeit, or have critical vulnerabilities because of poor manufacturing practices.

4)    Added new focus area for small business – what this means is yet to be seen.

“Engagement and collaboration will continue to be essential to the framework’s success,” said Matt Barrett of NIST. “The Cybersecurity Framework will need to evolve as threats, technologies and industries evolve. With this update, we’ve demonstrated that we have a good process in place for bringing stakeholders together to ensure the framework remains a great tool for managing cybersecurity risk”, he said.

PwC’s 2018 Global State of Information Security Survey (GSISS) indicated that respondents from healthcare payer and provider organizations, as well as oil and gas companies, said the NIST Cybersecurity Framework is the most commonly adopted set information security standards in their respective industries.

In another case, the University of Chicago’s Biological Sciences Division (BSD) successfully implemented the Cybersecurity Framework to help them comply with HIPAA and other federal data security rules.

If you want to know how to customize this to your organization please contact us.